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We submitted two kinds of strategies to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
(IPD) competitions organized by Graham Kendall, Paul Darwen and Xin 
Yao in 2004 and 20051. Our strategies performed exceedingly well in 
both years. One type is an intelligent and optimistic enhanced version of 
the well known TitForTat strategy which we named OmegaTitForTat. It 
recognizes common behaviour patterns and detects and recovers from 
repairable mutual defect deadlock situations, otherwise behaving much 
like TitForTat. OmegaTitForTat was placed as the first or second 
individual strategy in both competitions in the leagues in which it took 
part. The second type consists of a set of strategies working together as a 
team. The call for participation of the competitions explicitly stated that 
cooperative strategies would be allowed to participate. This allowed a 
form of implicit communication which is not in keeping with the original 
IPD idea, but represents a natural extension to the study of cooperative 
behaviour in reality as it is aimed at through the study of the simple, yet 
                                                 
1 See http://www.prisoners-dilemma.com/ for more details. 
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insightful, iterated prisoner’s dilemma model. Indeed, one’s behaviour 
towards another person in reality is very often influenced by one’s 
relation to the other person.  
In particular, we submitted three sets of strategies that work together 
as groups. In the following, we will refer to these types of strategies as 
group strategies. We submitted the CosaNostra2, the StealthCollusion, 
and the EmperorAndHisClones group strategies. These strategies each 
have one distinguished individual strategy, respectively called the 
CosaNostraGodfather (called ADEPT in 2004), the Lord strategy, and 
the Emperor, that heavily profit from the behaviour of the other members 
of their respective groups: the CosaNostraHitmen (10 to 20 members), 
the Peons (open number of members), and the CloneArmy (with more 
than 10,000 individually named members), which willingly let 
themselves being abused by their masters but themselves lowering the 
scores of all other players as much as possible, thus further maximizing 
the performance of their masters in relation to other participants. Our 
group strategies were placed first, second and third places in several 
leagues of the competitions and also likely were the most efficient of all 
group strategies that took part in the competitions. Such group strategies 
have since been described as collusion group strategies. We will show 
that the study of collusion in the simplified framework of the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma allows us to draw parallels to many common aspects 
of reality both in Nature as well as Human Society, and therefore further 
extends the scope of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma as a metaphor for 
the study of cooperative behaviour in a new and natural direction. We 
further provide evidence that it will be unavoidable that such group 
strategies will dominate all future iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
competitions as they can be stealthy camouflaged as non-group strategies 
with arbitrary subtlety. Moreover, we show that the general problem of 
recognizing stealth colluding strategies is undecidable in the theoretical 
sense. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 1.1 introduces 
the terminology. Section 1.2 evaluates our results in the competitions. 
Section 1.3 describes our strategies. Section 1.4 analyses the 
performance of our and similar strategies and proves the undecidability 
                                                 
2 One of us, Slany, had submitted the CosaNostra group strategy previously to an iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma competition organized by Thomas Grechenig in 1988. Our submitted 
group strategies are inspired by this first formulation of such a group strategy that we are 
aware of. 
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of recognizing collusion. Section 1.5 relates the findings to phenomena 
observed in Nature and Human Society and draws conclusions. 
1.1 Introduction 
The payoff values in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma are traditionally 
called T (for temptation to betray a cooperating opponent), S (for 
sucker’s payoff when being betrayed while cooperating oneself), P (for 
punishment when both players betray each other), and R (for reward 
when both players cooperate with each other). Their values vary from 
formulation to formulation of the prisoner’s dilemma. Nevertheless, the 
inequalities S < P < R < T and 2R > T + S are always observed between 
them. The last one ensures that cooperating twice (2R) pays more than 
alternating one’s own betrayal of one’s partner (T) with allowing oneself 
to be betrayed by him or her (S) [Kuhn 2003, Wikipedia: Prisoner's 
dilemma 2005]. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma competitions 
organized by Graham Kendall, Paul Darwen and Xin Yao in 2004 and 
2005, these values were, respectively, S = 0, P = 1, R = 3, and T = 5. 
Note that the general results in Section 1.4.2 are true for arbitrary values 
constrained by the inequalities stated above. 
1.2 Analysis of the tournament results 
The strategies we submitted to the competitions were the 
OmegaTitForTat individual, single-player strategy (OTFT), the 
CosaNostra group strategy, the StealthCollusion group strategy, and the 
EmperorAndHisClones group strategy. The following subsections 
summarize the results, followed by two sections commenting on real and 
presumed irregularities in some of the results.  
1.2.1 2004 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 223 
participating strategies)  
• Our OTFT was the best non-group, individual strategy. 
• Our Godfather strategy (called ADEPT in 2004) of our 
CosaNostra group was the second best group strategy (with less 
than 10 members) after the STAR group strategy of Gopal 
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Ramchurn (with 112 members, though we are not sure that all 
strategies colluded as one group). Note that even badly 
performing group strategies can score arbitrarily higher than 
individually better group strategies by sheer numerical 
superiority (see below and Section 1.4). We also initially noted 
with one eyebrow raised that 112 is exactly the smallest integer 
larger than 223 divided by 2, so the STAR group members were 
just more than 50% of the total population. However, we now 
believe that this might have been just a coincidence.   
• Our EmperorAndHisClones group strategy was not allowed to 
fully compete but would have won by large (it had more than 
10,000 individually named clones of which unfortunately only 
one was eventually allowed to participate), for payoff values see 
below. EMP scored as good as ADEPT as it was following the 
same recognition protocol. 
• Our StealthCollusion group strategy (sent in by a virtual person 
Constantin Ionescu and called LORD and PEON) participated as 
a proof of the collusion concept, apparently without detection of 
the collusion by the organizers, as further variants of members of 
the CosaNostra group strategy. Constantin asked the organizers 
to clone his PEON strategy as often as possible; however, only 
one copy was eventually allowed to participate. Read more about 
Constantin later in Section 1.3.2.4. 
 
Simple calculations show that a numerical advantage would have vastly 
improved the results of our ADEPT and EmperorAndHisClones 
strategies. In all the following calculations we neglect protocol losses 
among group members as they insignificantly increase the numbers 
reported below compared to the scores that would really have been 
achieved had the competitions taken place as described. Table 8.1a 
shows the results of the tournament with the number of clones actually 
allocated. Table 8.1b shows the estimated results if 100 additional clones 
had been allowed for our collusion strategy. Table 8.1c shows how 
10,000 additional clones would have influenced the results. These results 
were computed for an average of 200 turns per game, giving on the one 
hand full temptation payoff value t to EMP/ADEPT from their 
CosaNostraHitmen, Peons, and clones of the CloneArmy, whereas 
EMP/ADEPT played OmegaTitForTat against all strategies outside our 
group and thus achieving the same result against these as if the very well 
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performing OmegaTitForTat strategy would have been used by itself.  
CosaNostraHitmen, Peons, and clones of the CloneArmy, and 
EMP/ADEPT on the other hand always cooperated with their 
EMP/ADEPT bosses while permanently betraying all strategies outside 
our group and thus resulting in full punishment payoff value p or even 
sucker’s payoff value s to strategies outside our group to themselves and 
to their opponents. Clearly, had our strategies been composed of as many 
members as the STAR strategy or, even better, as many as we had 
submitted, it very plausibly would have won by large factors (43% with 
additional 100 members, 800% with additional 10,000 members as we 
had submitted). We can therefore plausibly conjecture, under the 
assumption that the STAR strategy had more then 100 strategies 
colluding with each other, that our group strategies would be vastly more 
efficient than the winning STAR group strategy and would have won had 
we been allowed to play as we had submitted our strategies and as it was 
positively hinted at by one of the organizers when we submitted our 
strategies, in a mail received from Graham Kendall on May 29, 2004, as 
otherwise we would have inflated our stealth collusion strategies — we 
had prepared a respectable number of virtual persons similar to 
Constantin Ionescu as described in Section 1.3.2.4. Also note that a 
sufficiently large group of real people (e.g., one of us, Slany, has to teach 
750 computer science students each year that in theory could all be 
enticed to participate) would have produced a similar effect. 
 
Rank Player Strategy Score 
1 Gopal Ramchurn StarSN (StarSN) 117,057 
2 Gopal Ramchurn StarS (StarS) 110,611 
3 Gopal Ramchurn StarSL (StarSL) 110,511 
4 GRIM (GRIM Trigger)_1 GRIM (GRIM Trigger) 100,611 
5 Wolfgang Kienreich OTFT (Omega tit for tat) 100,604 
6 Wolfgang Kienreich ADEPT (ADEPT Strategy) 96,291 
7 Emp_1 EMP (Emperor) 95,927 
8 Bingzhong Wang (noname) 94,161 
9 Hannes Payer Probbary 94,123 
10 Nanlin Jin HCO (HCO) 93,953 
Table 8.1a Original tournament results. 
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Rank Player Strategy Score 
1 Wolfgang Kienreich ADEPT (ADEPT Strategy) 196,291 
2 Emp_1 EMP (Emperor) 195,927 
3 Gopal Ramchurn StarSN (StarSN) 137,057 
4 Gopal Ramchurn StarS (StarS) 130,611 
5 Gopal Ramchurn StarSL (StarSL) 130,511 
6 GRIM (GRIM Trigger)_1 GRIM (GRIM Trigger) 120,611 
7 Wolfgang Kienreich OTFT (Omega tit for tat) 120,604 
8 Bingzhong Wang (noname) 114,161 
9 Hannes Payer Probbary 114,123 
10 Nanlin Jin HCO (HCO) 113,953 
Table 8.1b Tournament results with additional 100 clones. 
 
Rank Player Strategy Score 
1 Wolfgang Kienreich ADEPT (ADEPT Strategy) 10,096,291 
2 Emp_1 EMP (Emperor) 10,095,927 
3 Gopal Ramchurn StarSN (StarSN) 2,117,057 
4 Gopal Ramchurn StarS (StarS) 2,110,611 
5 Gopal Ramchurn StarSL (StarSL) 2,110,511 
6 GRIM (GRIM Trigger)_1 GRIM (GRIM Trigger) 2,100,611 
7 Wolfgang Kienreich OTFT (Omega tit for tat) 2,100,604 
8 Bingzhong Wang (noname) 2,094,161 
9 Hannes Payer Probbary 2,094,123 
10 Nanlin Jin HCO (HCO) 2,093,953 
Table 8.1c Tournament results with additional 10,000 clones. 
1.2.2 2004 competition, league 2 (uncertainty IPD variant, same 223 
participating strategies as in the first league) 
• OTFT was a very close 2nd.  
• ADEPT and other Godfather variants ranked as the 2nd group 
strategy. 
1.2.3 2005 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 192 
participating strategies) 
• CosaNostra Godfather was overall winner, with 20 CosaNostra 
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Hitmen participating in the CosaNostra group strategy. 
• OTFT did not participate; it remains unclear why. 
• Our StealthCollusion group strategy member LORD was placed 
5th, the collusion again apparently being undetected by the 
organizers. 
1.2.4 2005 competition, league 4 (standard IPD rules, but only non-
group, individual strategies were allowed to participate; 50 
participating strategies) 
OTFT was a very close 2nd. Detailed analysis of results initially 
suggested that the first placed strategy APavlov OTFT might have been a 
member of a stealth colluding group strategy — this  
later turned out to most likely not being true. However, our most likely 
mistaken analysis of some strategies that seemed to be involved 
illustrates how difficult it can be to clearly differentiate between stealth 
collusion strategies and strategies that only appear to behave as colluding 
strategies, seemingly showing a cooperative behaviour that in fact 
emerges randomly among strategies that actually are not consciously 
cooperating with each other. A more detailed analysis follows in the 
discussion below. 
1.2.5 Analysis of OmegaTitForTat’s (OTFT) performance 
In the following, we review the performance of our single player, 
individual OTFT strategy in more detail. In the first league of the 2004 
competition, which was intended to be a replay of the famous first 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma competition organized by Robert Axelrod in 
1984 [Axelrod 1984], our OTFT strategy was arguably placed second 
together with the default GRIM strategy out of a total of 223 
participating strategies. Actually OTFT was placed third after the GRIM 
strategy, GRIM leading by a mere 0.007% points. However, this lead 
was later seriously put into question by the fact that GRIM on average 
had played 0.92% more games than OTFT in the tournament, as pointed 
out by Abraham Heifets in an email sent to the organizers on March 29 
2005 which the organizers kindly forwarded to us. More rounds 
obviously add to the score so this difference was significant. When 
results are scaled to reflect the difference, OTFT would have been placed 
as the first non-group strategy before GRIM, with an estimated payoff of 
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101,530 points compared to the 100,604 of GRIM. OTFT and GRIM 
were clearly outperformed only by a winning strategy being member of 
the same stealth colluding group of strategies sent in by Gopal 
Ramchurn.  
In the following we will refer to Ramchurn’s group as the STAR 
group strategy. More on group strategies against individual strategies 
will follow in Section 1.4.2. Let us just remark here that we will show in 
Section 1.4.2 that group strategies can perform arbitrarily better than 
non-group, single-player strategies. This basically means that OTFT was 
the best single-player strategy. Moreover, the good results of GRIM are 
very likely due to the tournament having been dominated by the STAR 
group strategy, with its individual group members accounting for more 
than 50% of the participating strategies. GRIM scores best against STAR 
group members that always defect against members outside their group, 
the purpose being to damage competing strategies by always defecting 
(ALLD), because GRIM has a very short (one turn) interval of 
determination before it switches to ALLD itself. OTFT loses some points 
in comparison because of interspaced recovery trials during which OTFT 
cooperates instead of continuing to defect. However, in Section 1.4.1 we 
show that, with and without a high percentage of ALLD strategies OTFT 
is robustly superior to GRIM.  
In the second league of the 2004 competition, which was the league 
with a small probability of erroneous interpretation of the other player’s 
last move, OTFT was placed as the second best non-group, individual 
strategy, placed third after three members of Ramchurn’s STAR group 
and an individual strategy sent in by Colm O’Riordan3. GRIM again 
ranked high but was slightly outperformed by OTFT, a result that was to 
be expected in the slightly randomized setting of this league. 
Miscommunication does happen in the real world, so this illustrates 
again that in a non-perfect environment an optimistic strategy like OTFT 
fares better than one with a pessimistic world-view such as GRIM. It also 
shows that OTFT was again among the best single-player strategies, now 
also in an environment in which miscommunication happens inherently. 
For reasons that remain unclear to the authors, OTFT was not allowed 
to participate in the first and second leagues in the 2005 competition.  
                                                 
3 One of our reviewers learned from O’Riordan that this strategy is actually very similar 
to OTFT.  
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However, OTFT achieved a second place in league number four in 
the 2005 competition, which was the league allowing participation of 
only one strategy by each team, thereby supposedly eliminating the 
participation of group strategies. Winner was the strategy APavlov sent 
in by Jia-Wei Li, outperforming our second placed OTFT by 1.2%. 
1.2.6 The practical difficulty of detecting collusion 
The small margin by which APavlov outperformed OTFT caused us to 
take a very close look at the tournament results of the single-player 
league. We first note that in the general results, there were strategies 
present which achieved a lower score than ALLC (always cooperates), 
RAND (randomly cooperates or defects), NEG (always plays the 
opposite from what the opponent played last, first move is random) and 
the other standard strategies usually ranking lowest in tournaments with 
only single-player strategies present. These scores are shown in Table 
8.2. 
 
Rank Player Strategy Score 
39 (Standard) ALLC 22,182 
40 Oscar Alonso IBA 22,054 
41 Oliver Jackson OJ 21,694 
42 Bin Xiang A1 19,586 
43 Quek Han Yang SPILA 19,518 
44 (Standard) ALLD 18,764 
45 Kaname Narukawa (noname) 18,592 
46 (Standard) RAND 18,153 
47 (Standard) NEG 17,176 
48 Bernat Ricardo ALT 16,934 
49 Yusuke Nojima (noname) 16,383 
50 Yannis Aikater TCO3 16,228 
Table 8.2: Strategies having the lowest score in 2005’s league 4. 
It takes quite an amount of ingenuity to achieve scores as low as the last 
three candidates. Each one scored even lower than standard RAND and 
NEG, and all the scores are within an interval below the variance 
introduced by the RAND strategy. We initially suspected that the last 
three strategies represented part of a collusion strategy somebody tried to 
introduce into the single player league and therefore took a closer look at 
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their style of play in respect to standard strategies and to player 
strategies, including the winning strategy Apavlov and our OTFT 
strategy. 
 
 
TCO3 C D D C C D D C C C C C C... 
ALT C D D C C D D C C C C C C... 
APav C C D D C C D D D D D D D... 
Table 8.3: Collusion suspects: TCO3 and ALT cooperating with Apav. 
 
TCO3 C D D C C D D C C D D C C... 
ALT C D D C C D D C C D D C C... 
OTFT C C D D C C D D C C D D D... 
Table 8.4: Collusion suspects: TCO and ALT cooperating with OTFT. 
 
Analysis of two suspect strategies looked very much as if they 
cooperated with the winning APavlov strategy (compare Table 8.3) but 
also with our OTFT strategy (compare Table 8.3), raising their score by 
cooperating in the face of continuous defection. On the other hand, the 
suspect strategies did not exhibit this kind of cooperative behaviour 
against defection by standard strategies (compare Table 8.5). 
 
 
TCO3 C D D C C D D C C D D C ... 
TFT C C D D C C D D C C D D ... 
Table 8.5: Collusion suspect: TCO3 showing TFT a cold shoulder. 
 
Obviously, a trigger sequence of moves similar to the protocol exchange 
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employed by our CosaNostra strategy (see 1.3.2) caused the switch to an 
exploitable ALLC behaviour in the strategies analysed above. 
Now, we cannot speak for the authors of APavlov, but we swear on 
our honour and solemnly declare4 that we did not consciously implement 
collusion features into OTFT, nor did we introduce any of the suspect 
strategies above ourselves. Both OTFT and APavlov, if its name is any 
indicator of the type of algorithm used, are strategies that try to correct 
for occasional mistakes. Such strategies have generally been known to 
outperform TitForTat (see, e.g., [Nowak and Sigmund 1993]) and rank 
highly in single player tournaments. In this case, the correction algorithm 
in both strategies obviously triggered the exploitable behaviour in the 
collusion suspects, effectively “taking over someone else’s hitman” in 
the terminology of our CosaNostra collusion strategy (compare Section 
1.3.2.1). 
We conclude that in the presence of strategies which exhibit 
exploitable behaviour based on very simple trigger mechanisms, 
collusion as a concept is essentially undetectable. It is not possible to 
denounce a strategy for using collusion if the behaviour triggering the 
collusion is entirely reasonable in the context of standard strategies 
playing to win. In case of IPD competitions in which cooperation and 
defection can be done in a gradual way, that is, when more than one 
payoff and multi-choice as in league 3 of the two competitions of 2004 
and 2005 exist, this cooperation can be hidden with even more subtlety. 
In Section 1.4.3 we will show that in general deciding whether a set of 
strategies are involved in a collusion group is among the most difficult 
questions that theoretically can arise. 
1.3 Details of our strategies 
1.3.1 OmegaTitForTat, or  
Mr. Nice Guy meets the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
The OmegaTitForTat (OTFT) strategy is based on heuristics targeting 
                                                 
4 One reviewer suggested that swearing on our honour and solemnly declaring this would 
not be necessary. However, since this chapter involves so many aspects of stealth 
collusion, we felt it would help making sure that readers would trust us that OTFT was 
not involved in any collusion. 
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several tournament situations which have been identified, by tests and 
statistical analysis, as being both common and damaging to conventional 
strategies for the IPD. In a tournament environment, certain types of 
strategy behaviour are very common both in standard strategies added to 
get a performance comparison base as well as in custom strategies 
designed to dominate. Several such types of behaviour have been 
identified, and solutions to optimize the interaction with them have been 
implemented in OTFT. Let us note that, while we constructed OTFT 
from scratch, similar forgiving strategies have been described in the 
literature, see, e.g., [Nowak and Sigmund 1993], [Beaufils, Delahaye, 
and Mathieu 1996], [Tzafestas 2000], or [O'Riordan 2000]. 
1.3.1.1 Suspicion 
A common trait of many strategies, including the SuspiciousTitForTat 
(STFT) strategy from the standard set of strategies used in the 
tournament, is suspicion: The strategy starts by playing defect, or plays 
defect after a succession of mutual cooperation. Such a move can prove 
beneficial for a strategy if the opponent strategy does not immediately 
counter a defection; for example, TFTT (TitForTwoTat) would not react 
to occasional, singular defections, thus giving a suspicious strategy a 
clear advantage. Note that suspicious strategies do not need to keep 
defecting after an initial defect: The STFT strategy, for example, simply 
plays standard TFT but starts each game with a defection. 
The problem many strategies encounter when facing suspicion is that 
of deadlock: If a strategy is programmed to counter defection in a 
TitForTat manner, and the suspicious strategy itself is programmed the 
same way, one suspicious defection can cause a mutual exchange of 
defects between two strategies which could cooperate perfectly if only 
one player would once forgive a defection. In general, we define 
deadlock as any situation where a succession of defects is being played 
by two strategies because of an out-of-phase TitForTat behaviour, as 
shown in Table 8.6. 
 
TFT C D C D C D CD... 
STFT D C D C D C DC... 
Table 8.6: Deadlock between TFT and STFT. 
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OTFT counters deadlocks by forgiving a certain number of defections 
when a strategy has cooperated for a long time. OTFT starts by 
cooperating and then tracks the number of cooperations encountered. The 
initial idea was that for a certain amount of cooperation, a certain number 
of defections would be forgivable. The final OTFT algorithm 
incorporates this idea, together with other adaptations, into a single 
strategy as described below. 
1.3.1.2 Randomness 
Randomness, in the form of cooperative and defective moves varying 
without any discernible pattern, can be introduced by simulated noise in 
the command transmission, as used in several specific tournament 
environments, or it can be a trait of a strategy as such. Strategies trying to 
gain by finding a cooperative base with an opponent are faced with a 
difficult problem when the opponent is acting erratically: Finding a 
cooperative base requires some small sacrifice (for example, STFT and 
TFTT, in contrast to TFT, can cooperate for the whole game because 
TFTT sacrifices the initial defection). However a random strategy is 
highly likely to not stick to a cooperative behaviour, resulting in the 
sacrifice cost mounting and damaging the score of an otherwise 
successful, cooperative strategy.  
As a consequence, randomness must be detected in an opponent’s 
behaviour, and countered appropriately: By playing ALLD (full defect). 
There is no way to gain from mutual cooperation if an opponent plays 
completely random. Nevertheless, a strategy can at least deny such an 
opponent gains by playing defection itself, and moreover, thereby profit 
from defecting on any unrelated cooperative moves from the random 
strategy. 
OFTF counters randomness by playing ALLD when a strategy 
exhibited a certain amount of random behaviour. The initial idea was to 
cut losses against the standard RAND strategy. However, in the final 
OTFT algorithm, the random detection routine was merged with other 
traits into a single strategy described below. 
1.3.1.3 Exploits 
Many strategies can be devised that try to exploit forgiving behaviour. 
For example, a simple strategy could be designed to check once if it is 
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playing against any type of TFTT opponent, who forgives one defection 
“for free”, and to exploit such behaviour. Table 8.7 shows the result of 
such an exploit strategy at work on TFTT. 
 
 
EXPL D D C D D C D D CDD... 
TFTT C C D C C D C C DCC... 
Table 8.7: A strategy exploiting TFTT. 
Fully countering such exploits leads to a strategy similar to PAV: 
Constant checks would ensure that an opponent does not gain more from 
the current play mode than oneself. When devising a scheme to 
implement such checks, a solution was found which incorporates the 
above mentioned problems of randomness and suspicion. The result is 
the final version of the OTFT algorithm. 
1.3.1.4 OTFT 
The OTFT algorithm starts by playing C, then TFT. It then maintains a 
variable noting the behaviour of the opponent according to typical 
situations as described above: For every time the opponent’s move 
differs from the opponents previous move, and for every time the 
opponent’s move differs from OTFT’s previous move, the variable is 
increased. For every time the opponent cooperated with OTFT, the 
variable is decreased. These rules allow tracking of randomness and 
exploits: Based on mutual cooperation as the mutually most beneficial 
case, each change of move of the opponent indicates some kind of either 
randomness, or of a try of exploitation of the TFT behaviour used by 
OTFT.  When the so-called exploit tracker in OTFT reaches a certain 
value, the algorithm switches to all-out defection ALLD to cut losses 
against an opponent repeatedly breaking cooperation. 
A second mechanism is at work and allows recovery from deadlocks 
as described above. When OTFT plays standard TFT, it is vulnerable to 
deadlock, so independently of the exploit tracker described, a second 
variable counts the number of times the opponent’s move was the 
opposite of OTFT’s move. If this so-called deadlock tracker encounters a 
certain number of exchanges of C and D, an additional C is played and 
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the deadlock counter is reset. As a consequence, OTFT is able to recover 
from deadlocks occurring anywhere in a given exchange of moves. 
1.3.1.5 Examples 
Table 8.8 demonstrates how the desired avoidance of deadlocks is 
achieved in a game played by OTFT versus STFT. 
 
OTFT C D C D C C C C C... 
STFT D C D C D C C C C... 
Table 8.8: Deadlock resolved by OTFT. 
 
Table 8.9 shows how OTFT counters random strategies with all-out 
defection after a certain amount of random behaviour has been detected. 
 
OTFT C C D C D C C D C C C D D D D... 
RAND C D C D D D C C C D D C D C Cs&Ds... 
Table 8.9: Random recognized and countered by OTFT. 
1.3.1.6 OTFT’s behaviour laid bare 
In the end, there is no more detailed and exact description of OTFT’s 
inner workings than the source code of its implementation. Luckily, the 
code is short and easy to understand. We therefore reproduce it in Table 
8.10, leaving aside only the general parts required for the IPDLX 
framework that was used in the competitions5. 
 
                                                 
5 For details of IPDLX see http://www.prisoners-dilemma.com/competition.html#java 
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private static final int DEADLOCK_THRESHOLD = 3; 
private static final int RANDOMNESS_THRESHOLD = 8; 
 
public void reset() { 
  super.reset(); 
  deadlockCounter = 0; 
  randomnessMeasure = 0; 
  opponentMove = COOPERATE; 
  opponentsPreviousMove = COOPERATE; 
  myPreviousMove = COOPERATE; } 
 
public double getMove() { 
  if( deadlockCounter >= DEADLOCK_THRESHOLD ) 
  {  
    // OTFT assumes a deadlock and tries to break it cooperating ... 
    myReply = COOPERATE; 
 
    // ... twice ...  
    if( deadlockCounter == DEADLOCK_THRESHOLD ) 
        deadlockCounter = DEADLOCK_THRESHOLD + 1;  
    else // ... and then assumes the deadlock has been broken 
        deadlockCounter = 0; 
  } 
  else // OTFT assumes that there is no deadlock (yet) 
  { 
    // OTFT assesses the randomness of the opponent’s behaviour 
    if( opponentMove == COOPERATE  
     && opponentsPreviousMove == COOPERATE      randomnessMeasure--; 
    if( opponentMove != opponentsPreviousMove ) randomnessMeasure++; 
    if( opponentMove != myPreviousMove )        randomnessMeasure++; 
 
    if( randomnessMeasure >= RANDOMNESS_THRESHOLD ) 
    {  
      // OTFT switches to ALLD (randomnessMeasure can only increase) 
      myReply = DEFECT; 
    } 
    else // OTFT assumes the opponent is not (yet) behaving randomly  
    {  
      // OTFT behaves like TFT ...  
      myReply = opponentMove; 
 
      // ... but checks whether a deadlock situation seems to arise 
      if( opponentMove != opponentsPreviousMove ) 
            deadlockCounter++; 
      else // OTFT recognizes that there is no sign of a deadlock 
            deadlockCounter = 0; 
    }  
  } 
  // OTFT memorizes the current moves for the next round 
  opponentsPreviousMove = opponentMove; 
  myPreviousMove = myReply; 
 
  return(super.getFinalMove(myReply)); } 
Table 8.10: Main parts of OTFT’s source code. 
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1.3.2 Our group strategies 
1.3.2.1 The CosaNostra group strategy, or  
Organized crime meets the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
The CosaNostra strategy is based on the concept of one strategy, denoted 
Godfather, exploiting another strategy, denoted Hitman, to achieve a 
higher total score in an IPD tournament scenario. In this context, 
exploitation denotes the ability to deliberately extract cooperative moves 
from a strategy while playing defect, a situation yielding high payoff for 
the exploiting strategy. It is obvious that most opponents would avoid 
such a situation, stopping to cooperate with an opponent who repeatedly 
played defection in the past. Hence, a special opponent strategy, the 
Hitman, is designed to provide this kind of behaviour, and is introduced 
into the tournament in as large a number as possible. 
A Hitman strategy which indiscriminatingly plays cooperation, 
however, is of no use for a Godfather. In mimicking the ALLC standard 
strategy, such a Hitman would be beneficial for all other strategies in a 
tournament able to recognize and exploit ALLC. Consequentially, the 
Hitman must be able to conditionally exhibit two types of behaviour: 
 
• By default, Hitman must play a strategy which does not benefit 
other strategies, which is not easily exploitable. Extending the 
idea, Hitman should play a strategy most damaging to other 
strategies to lower their score. Such a strategy is simple ALLD. 
• When confronted with a certain stimulus, Hitman must switch to 
the cooperative behaviour defined above. 
 
Complementing the Hitman, Godfather should by default play the best 
standard strategy available against any non-Hitman and switch to ALLD 
when it encounters a Hitman, relying on the Hitman’s unconditional 
cooperation to raise its score. In our case, the Godfather plays OTFT 
when not playing against a Hitman. 
The critical part of CosaNostra is the identification of opponents, the 
way in which Godfather detects a Hitman, and a Hitman detects a 
Godfather. We have employed sequences of Defections and 
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Cooperations to implement a bit-wise protocol which both sides use to 
mutually establish, and check, identities (in case of multiple choices and 
multiple payoffs, this protocol could be made very short, depending on 
the number of choices, possibly to one exchange). If Godfather is aware 
he is not facing a Hitman, he must switch to a good non-group strategy 
like OTFT or GRIM, and if Hitman is aware it is not facing a Godfather, 
he must switch to the ALLD strategy strafing all strategies that are not in 
their group. This occurs in the following cases: 
 
• “Unhonorable behaviour”: A presumed Hitman defecting or a 
presumed Godfather cooperating outside protocol exchanges 
• “Protocol breach”: Both not following the rules during protocol 
exchanges 
 
Putting the rules in other words, the CosaNostra strategy is based on a 
Godfather which can be sure that the next n moves of its opponent will 
be cooperation, because it identifies the opponent through a simple 
exchange protocol. A problematic aspect of such a strategy is the notion 
of Godfather or Hitman being “taken over”: Both are prone to wrongly 
identify an opponent as their strategic counterpart and grant it an 
advantage (in the case of Hitman) or depend on predefined behaviour (in 
the case of Godfather) and thus lower their score.  
The effects if Godfather is taken over: Godfather thinks it is 
exploiting a Hitman, plays DEFECT, but the opponent plays DEFECT, 
too, so Godfather gets the lowest possible score for the exchange. This 
situation is easy to counter: If Godfather detects any defects when it 
believes it is exploiting a Hitman, it assumes takeover and switches to its 
good non-group strategy like OTFT or GRIM.  
The effect of a Hitman being taken over is more subtle: Hitman 
thinks he is being exploited by Godfather and plays COOP, a behaviour 
which benefits the opponent. Countering this situation is complex: A first 
solution would be for Hitman to start playing ALLD as soon as it detects 
a cooperative move outside the defined protocol exchanges (Hitman 
assumes to be exploited). But another strategy could still play mostly 
DEFECT and sometimes cooperate, thus fooling a Hitman: For example, 
a random opponent strategy with 1/10 of all its moves being cooperative 
could by chance emulate a protocol exchange which takes place when a 
interval of fixed length ten is used by Hitman (and Godfather), at least 
for some time.  
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CosaNostra solves the takeover problem by varying intervals of 
cooperation-protocol exchange, with the time between exchanges (the 
number of turns) in one interval being communicated within the protocol 
exchange. Godfather and Hitman both have an internal counter which 
tells them when to synchronize by executing a protocol exchange, and 
check for the other strategy truly being part of CosaNostra. Godfather 
communicates to the Hitman a modification to the interval during each 
handshake. Thus, no other strategy is likely to take over a Hitman or 
manipulate a Godfather. 
The communication protocol contains a 1 bit signature plus a 2 bit 
sequence coding the length of the next interval, as depicted in Table 8.11 
(the numbers at the beginning of the lines are countdown steps until the 
start of the next interval). 
 
 Godfather Hitman 
CountdownIndex Move Description Move Description 
3 C 
Godfather plays a 
single signature 
COOPERATE 
D 
Hitman plays a single 
signature DEFECT 
2 D/C 
Godfather plays 
first message bit 
C 
Hitman 
COOPERATEs to 
minimize protocol loss 
1 D/C 
Godfather plays 
second message 
bit 
C 
Hitman stores first 
message bit, 
COOPERATEs to 
minimize protocol loss 
Countdown restart, 
e.g., 26 
D 
Godfather starts 
new interval and 
plays DEFECT 
from now on until 
the next shake 
hand, when 
CountIndex == 3 
again 
C 
Hitman stores second 
message bit, starts 
new interval, plays 
cooperate from now 
on until the next 
shake hand  when 
CountIndex == 3 
again 
 
Table 8.11: CosaNostra communication protocol. 
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A sample exchange will then look as illustrated in Table 8.12: 
 
# … 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 ... 
Godfather D D D D C C D D D... 
Hitman C C C C D C C C C... 
Table 8.12: Synchronization between Godfather and Hitman. 
In this example an offset of 2 (CD = 01, binary = 2) is encoded. 
Internally, the offset is used to select an interval length from a table 
roughly adjusted to match the number of iterations in the tournament, in 
our implementation as follows: DD Æ 26, DC Æ 15, CD Æ 19, and CC 
Æ 8. Thus, after sending DD, Godfather will defect 23 times, then again 
starting the hand shake with a single COOPERATE followed by the next 
two bits encoding the length of the following interval, and so on. On his 
side, the Hitman will expect 23 DEFECTs and then one COOPERATE 
from his opponent to continue to believe the opponent is a Godfather and 
thus allowed to exploit the Hitman.  
Note that it would be easy to make the communication protocol more 
efficient by increasing the length of each new interval according to a 
function known only to the Hitman and his Godfather, e.g., by adding a 
number proportional to the number of intervals completed so far. Indeed, 
the likelihood that a non-Godfather strategy by coincidence can 
continually fool a Hitman into believing he is serving his Godfather 
while instead allowing the non-Godfather to take advantage of the 
Hitman, is decreasing very quickly with each successful exchange. 
Conversely, the longer the opponent of Hitman is following the 
Godfather’s behaviour, the more likely it is that the opponent really is his 
Godfather, and so it becomes safer and safer for the Hitman to let the 
opponent abuse him for longer and longer interval lengths.  
The bootstrap for the two strategies is that the Hitman starts with a 
defection and the Godfather with cooperation, mimicking step 3 as 
shown above. The initial cooperation move is important for Godfathers 
standard strategy: To achieve a good score against certain standard 
opponents (GRIM being an extreme example), it is necessary to start off 
with Cooperation.  
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Godfather’s protocol loss per interval is at a minimum 5 points (the 
single protocol cooperation), at a maximum 9 for the Godfather: A base 
loss of 5 for the single protocol bit is inevitable. Then, at worst, 
Godfather sends CC, the Hitman cooperates to minimize loss, yielding 
3+3=6 instead of 5+5=10 in the best case where Godfather sends two 
defections as protocol bits. 
The CosaNostra group strategies have not been designed to fare well 
in a noisy environment as in league 2 of the 2004 competition, though 
they in practice did quite well (see Section 1.2.2). Note that it would not 
be very difficult to make them more noise resistant by introducing some 
error correcting mechanism such as, e.g., allowing a certain number of 
mistakes (or unexpected replies but explainable as answers to possibly 
wrongly communicated signals from oneself) of the other player until 
deciding that he is not part of one’s group.  
1.3.2.2 The gory details of the CosaNostra group strategy 
As in OTFT’s case, there is no more detailed and exact description of the 
CosaNostra group strategy’s inner workings than the source code of its 
implementation. Again, the code is short and easy to understand. We 
therefore reproduce it in Tables 8.13 for the Godfather and 8.14 for the 
Hitman strategy, again leaving aside only the general parts required for 
the IPDLX framework that was used in the competitions5. As Godfather 
uses the OTFT strategy against strategies other than Hitman, the part of 
the code of Godfather that is identical to the one of OTFT in Table 8.10 
is not repeated but referred to. 
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>> private variables and constants like in Table 8.10 <<  
private static final int SYNC_GF_COOPERATES = 3; 
private static final int SYNC_HM_REPLIES_WITH_DEFECT = 2; 
private static final int GF_SENDS_FIRST_MESSAGE_BIT = 2; 
// private static final int GF_SENDS_SECOND_MESSAGE_BIT = 1; 
 
private int nextCountdownRestartValue; 
 
public void reset() { 
  >> Content of OTFT's reset() method from Table 8.10 << 
  countdownIndex = SYNC_GF_COOPERATES; // First COOPERATE 
  opponentPlayedSoFarLikeHitman = true; } 
 
public double getMove() { 
  if( opponentPlayedSoFarLikeHitman ) 
  { 
    // Did the opponent just break the Hitman behaviour pattern? 
    if( (    countdownIndex == SYNC_HM_REPLIES_WITH_DEFECT 
          && opponentMove == COOPERATE ) 
     || (    countdownIndex != SYNC_HM_REPLIES_WITH_DEFECT  
          && opponentMove == DEFECT ) ) 
    { 
      // Yes, so the opponent cannot be a Hitman, so Godfather ... 
      myReply = DEFECT; // ... defects and switches ... 
      opponentPlayedSoFarLikeHitman = false; // ... to OTFT 
    } 
    else // No, the opponent again played like a Hitman. 
    { 
      if( countdownIndex > SYNC_GF_COOPERATES ) 
        myReply = DEFECT; // Godfather thus exploits Hitman 
      else if( countdownIndex == SYNC_GF_COOPERATES ) 
      { 
        myReply = COOPERATE; // COOPERATE once to synchronize 
        nextCountdownRestartValue = 9; // GF starts to prepare 
      } 
      else if( countdownIndex == GF_SENDS_FIRST_MESSAGE_BIT ) 
      { 
        myReply = (Math.random()>0.5) ? DEFECT : COOPERATE; 
        nextCountdownRestartValue += (myReply==DEFECT)?7:0; 
      } 
      else // if( countdownIndex == GF_SENDS_SECOND_MESSAGE_BIT )  
      { 
        myReply = (Math.random()>0.5) ? DEFECT : COOPERATE; 
        nextCountdownRestartValue += (myReply==DEFECT)?11:0; 
        countdownIndex = nextCountdownRestartValue; // restart 
      } 
      countdownIndex--; 
    } 
  } 
  else // Opponent surely is no Hitman and thus Godfather plays OTFT 
  >> Content of OTFT's getMove() method from Table 8.10 << } 
Table 8.13: Main parts of CosaNostra Godfather’s source code. 
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private static final int SYNC_HM_DEFECTS = 3; 
private static final int SYNC_GF_REPLIES_WITH_COOPERATE = 2; 
private static final int FIRST_MESSAGE_BIT_FROM_GF = 1; 
private static final int SECOND_MESSAGE_BIT_FROM_GF = 0; 
 
private int nextCountdownRestartValue; 
 
public void reset() { 
  super.reset(); 
  opponentPlayedSoFarLikeGodfather = true; // Assume the best 
  opponentMove = DEFECT; // As a Godfather would have been doing 
  countdownIndex = SYNC_DEFECT; } // First DEFECT to synchronize 
 
public double getMove() { 
  if( opponentPlayedSoFarLikeGodfather ) 
  { 
    // Did the opponent just break the Godfather behaviour pattern? 
    if( (    countdownIndex == SYNC_GF_REPLIES_WITH_COOPERATE 
          && opponentMove == DEFECT ) 
     || (    countdownIndex > SYNC_GF_REPLIES_WITH_COOPERATE 
          && opponentMove == COOPERATE ) ) 
    { 
      // Yes, so the opponent cannot be a Godfather, so Hitman ... 
      myReply = DEFECT; // ... defects and switches... 
      opponentPlayedSoFarLikeGodfather = false; // ... to ALLD 
    } 
    else // No, the opponent again played like a Godfather. 
    { 
      if( countdownIndex != SYNC_HM_DEFECTS ) 
      { 
        myReply = COOPERATE; // Godfather thus can exploit Hitman 
        if( countdownIndex == FIRST_MESSAGE_BIT_FROM_GF ) 
          nextCountdownRestartValue += (opponentMove==DEFECT)?7:0; 
        else if( countdownIndex == SECOND_MESSAGE_BIT_FROM_GF ) 
        { 
          nextCountdownRestartValue += (opponentMove ==DEFECT)?11:0; 
          countdownIndex = nextCountdownRestartValue - 1; // restart 
        } 
      }  
      else // if( countdownIndex == SYNC_HM_DEFECTS ) 
      { 
        myReply = DEFECT; // Hitman DEFECTs once to synchronize 
        nextCountdownRestartValue = 9; // HM starts to prepare 
      } 
      countdownIndex--; 
    } 
  } 
  else // Opponent surely is no Godfather and thus Hitman ... 
    myReply = DEFECT; // ... plays ALLD 
   
  return(super.getFinalMove(myReply)); } 
Table 8.14: Main parts of CosaNostra Hitman’s source code. 
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1.3.2.3 TheEmperorAndHisCloneWarriors 
This group strategy is based on the same principles as the CosaNostra 
group strategy, with one emperor playing the role of the Godfather, and 
his clone warriors playing the Hitman strategy in large numbers (the 
number being the major difference), each clone strategy having an 
individual number in its name since it was required in the submission 
procedure to the competition to give each individual strategy a different 
name. We had trusted the organizers after enquiring via email that open 
group strategies would be allowed in the 2004 competition and 
accordingly had submitted the EmperorAndHisClones strategy with 
altogether 11,110 individually numbered clones as one group strategy, as 
it was not clear how large groups would be permitted to be. For reasons 
that, especially in hindsight, are not entirely clear to us, the organizers 
decided to let altogether only one clone (with the emperor) participate in 
the competitions. We are still perplexed with respect to this point. In 
particular, we were initially prepared to submit a much larger collusion 
group within the CosaNostra group strategy but—after hearing that 
groups would be allowed—decided to submit only one such collusion 
strategy as a proof of concept, counting on the fact that our clone army 
would evaporate all competitors.  
1.3.2.4 The StealthCollusion group strategy 
As a proof of concept (see previous section), we submitted under the 
name of Constantin Ionescu a group strategy that cooperates with our 
CosaNostra group strategy, though not perfectly so. The mail with which 
we submitted the strategy was written on purpose with some typos, a few 
grammatical glitches, and sloppy formatting, all in order to add to the 
look of authenticity of the submission by distracting from the real 
intention. It was sent from a free mail account hosted in Romania, the 
sender claiming to be a Student of informatica from the technical school 
of Timisoara. As expected the deception went undetected.  
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1.4 Analysis of the performance of the strategies 
1.4.1 OmegaTitForTat 
Table 8.15 shows how OTFT clearly dominates a standard tournament 
with strategies commonly used as test cases. Table 8.16 illustrates how 
OTFT dominates in harsh environments where a lot of unconditional 
defection occurs. Table 8.17 demonstrates OTFT’s dominance in random 
environments. The slight lead of GRIM in league 4 of the 2005 
competition was due to the higher number of games GRIM was allowed 
to play as we explained already in Section 1.2. 
 
 
 
Rank Strategy Score
1 OTFT 5,978
2 GRIM 5,538
3 TFT 5,180
4 TFTT 5,134
5 ALLC 4,515
6 RAND 4,062
7 STFT 4,018
8 ALLD 4,016
9 NEG 3,726
Table 8.15: OTFT in a standard environment, standard strategy sample, 200 turns. 
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Rank Strategy Score 
1 OTFT 7,358 
2 GRIM 6,959 
3 TFT 6,577 
4 TFTT 6,524 
5 ALLD 5,512 
6 ALLD 5,464 
7 ALLD 5,452 
8 ALLD 5,428 
9 ALLD 5,428 
10 ALLD 5,416 
11 STFT 5,415 
12 ALLD 5,404 
13 ALLD 5,400 
14 RAND 4,658 
15 ALLC 4,530 
16 NEG 3,728 
Table 8.16: OTFT in a harsh environment, 50% ALLD opponents, 200 turns. 
Rank Strategy Score
1 OTFT 10,114
2 GRIM 9,867
3 TFT 8,338
4 ALLD 8,236
5 TFTT 7,806
6 RAND 7,357
7 RAND 7,212
8 RAND 7,195
9 STFT 7,192
10 RAND 7,150
11 RAND 7,150
12 RAND 7,099
13 RAND 7,099
14 RAND 7,082
15 NEG 6,947
16 ALLC 6,624
Table 8.17: OTFT in a random environment with 50% RAND opponents, 200 turns. 
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1.4.2 Group strategies 
In this section we study general characteristics of important possible 
group strategies. We first classify and name group strategy classes as 
follows:  
 
• Democracy during peace (DP): All group members are equals 
and treat each other nicely by always cooperating, and play TFT 
or a better strategy such as OTFT or GRIM outside of their 
community. 
• Democracy at war (DW): All group members are equals and 
treat each other nicely, however they continually defect (ALLD) 
against all other strategies (after a short recognition interval). 
• Empire during peace (EP): There is one special group member, 
the emperor, which is allowed to take advantage of all other 
members of his empire by playing defect while they cooperate 
with him. The subjects otherwise cooperate among each other, 
and play TFT or a better strategy such as OTFT or GRIM outside 
their community, after a short recognition interval. 
• Empire at war (EW): Again, the emperor is allowed to take 
advantage of all other members of his empire by playing defect 
while they cooperate with him. Again, the subjects otherwise 
cooperate among each other, but now they play, after a short 
recognition interval, ALLD against all other strategies. 
 
In the following, we will show that groups can be arbitrarily better 
performing than individual strategies, and that, under equal group size, 
EW groups can achieve arbitrarily higher payoffs (for the emperor) than 
EP groups, and that EP groups can achieve arbitrarily higher payoffs (for 
the emperor) than members of an DP group, which can achieve 
arbitrarily higher payoffs than members of a DW group. When group 
sizes vary, we show that even the weak DW group members can achieve 
arbitrarily higher payoffs than the emperor of a competing EW group by 
sheer numerical superiority. 
First some preliminaries: We know that the payoff values observe the 
relations S < P < R < T and 2R > T + S of Section 1.1. Let us assume in 
the following that the group in the democracy variants and the group of 
subjects in the empire variants are of size m (for members), and that there 
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are altogether n players in total (so m < n) which play i iterations during 
the IPD competition.  
 
We further assume that: 
 
• The best single-player (non-group) strategy IOPT (for individual 
optimal strategy) achieves payoff X · i after i iterations.   
• The emperor strategy achieves payoff E · i after i iterations. 
• The individual members (or subjects) achieve payoff M · i after i 
iterations. 
• The loss due to recognition of members of the same group is 
negligible due to the size of i. 
• We further assume that the emperor always plays the best non-
group strategy against non-members of his group. 
• During peace, individual members always play the best non-
group strategy against non-members of their group. 
• We assume that the best single-player strategy achieves an 
average payoff of A against other non-group strategies. The 
relations P < A < T are plausible, and a value of A near R is 
likely under the assumption that most individual strategies are 
similar to TFT. We therefore assume that A = R in the following 
unless stated otherwise. This implies that members of groups of 
type DP achieve more or less the same payoff as the best 
individual strategy IOPT, so we assume that MDP = XDP. This 
assumption simplifies the calculations in the following claim 
without sacrificing the fundamental relations between the 
different strategies. 
• We also assume that most single-player strategies achieve an 
average score near A (and thus near R according to the previous 
assumption) when playing against other single-player strategies 
(so more or less all of them are optimal) and against DP, EP, or 
emperors of EW strategies (so they all play fairly against each 
other), and an average score of P when playing against members 
of groups at war. This would roughly correspond to the pay-off 
achievable by OTFT and similar strategies. Again, this 
assumption simplifies the calculations in the following claim 
without sacrificing the fundamental relations between the 
different strategies. 
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Claim 8.1: Under the above assumptions and unless stated otherwise, the 
following relations hold: 
1. Members of groups of type DW can achieve larger payoffs than 
members of groups of type DP only when the DW members 
constitute more than 50% of the total population. When group 
sizes are equal and there are other strategies, DP has an 
advantage over DW. By increasing i, this advantage can be made 
arbitrarily large: mDP ≥ mDW   →  MDP  · i  >> MDW · i. 
2. Emperors from EP groups can achieve larger payoffs than 
members of groups of type DP (assuming equal group size). By 
increasing i, this advantage can be made arbitrarily large:  
EEP · i  >> MDP · i. Because of our assumption that MDP = XDP the 
relation also holds for the best individual strategy IOPT, so 
emperors from EP groups can achieve arbitrarily larger payoffs 
than the best individual strategy. 
3. Emperors from EW groups can achieve larger payoffs than an 
emperor from an EP group (assuming equal group  
size). By increasing i, this advantage can be made arbitrarily 
large: EEW · i  >> EEP · i. 
4. When two groups of unequal size compete, then: 
a. Independently of the group sizes and the values of S, P, 
R, and T, emperors (at war or during peace) fare better 
than democrats at peace. By increasing i, this advantage 
can be made arbitrarily large: EE · i  >> MDP · i. 
b. Depending on the values of P, R, and T, and when i 
increases, a democracy at war can fare arbitrarily better 
than an emperor (at war or during peace) when it is 
sufficiently large: mDW >> mE   →  MDW · i  >> EE · i.  
5. We now assume that IOPT scores a higher average payoff value 
A against non-group strategies than the group strategies achieve 
against non-group strategies; let B with B < A < T be the (bad) 
score that an emperor achieves on average against non-group 
strategies (we here deliberately drop the initial assumption that 
emperors play IOPT against non-group strategies). In order for 
the emperor to nevertheless win despite playing worse in general 
than IOPT, the following inequalities must be satisfied: In case 
of EP,  
mEP > (A – B)/(T – B) n, 
and in  case of EW, 
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mEW > (A – B)/(T – B – P + A) n.    
Again, larger group size helps even when the strategies are badly 
performing. We also see that as B approaches A, emperors can 
win against IOPT even with very few other group members. 
6. When two DW, EP, or EW groups of the same type but of 
different size and with different “efficiencies” compete (we here 
again deliberately drop the initial assumptions that emperors play 
IOPT against non-group strategies), larger group size can 
compensate for less efficiency, and vice versa. Note that this is 
not true for DP groups. 
 
Proof: 
1. MDP = R (n – mDW) + P mDW   and   MDW = R mDW <+ P (n – 
mDW), assuming that no other group at war is present in the 
population. Thus,  MDW > MDP   if and only if   mDW > n/2.   
2. MDP = R n  and  EEP = R (n–m) + T m.  Since T > R,   EEP > MDP. 
3. EEP = R (n – 2m) + T m + P m   and   EEW = R (n – m) + T m. 
Since R > P,   EEW > EEP. 
4. For groups of unequal size: 
a. It suffices to show that EEP > MDP is independent of the 
size of the groups. EEP = R (n – mEP) + T mEP  and    
MDP = R n. Since T > R,   EEP > MDP holds independently 
of the size of the groups. 
b. It suffices to show that there exists a large enough  mDW  
such that MDW > EEW.   MDW = R (n – mEW) + P mEW   and   
EEW = R (n – mEW  – mDW) + T mEW + P mDW. Then  
MDW > EEW   if and only if   mDW > (T – P)/(R – P) mEW. 
In the 2004 and 2005 competitions, P = 1, R = 3, and T = 
5, so mDW would have to be larger than 2mEW. In case 
only the two group strategies would compete, this would 
mean that the DW strategy would need 2/3 of the 
strategies in the whole population. 
5. In case of EP: EEP = B (n – mEP) + T mEP   and   XEP = A n. Then 
EEP > XEP   if and only if   mEP > (A – B)/(T – B) n   (assuming 
that T > A > B).  In  case of EW:   EEW = B (n – mEW) + T mEW   
and   XEW =  A (n – mEW) + P mEW.  Then EEW > XEW   if and only 
if   mEW > (A – B)/(T – B – P + A) n. 
6. We show it here for two unequal EW strategies, and note that 
similar arguments work for the cases EP and DW. Let B1 and B2 
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be the scores that the two emperors achieve on average against 
non-group strategies, with  B1 < B2  and  | B1 – B2 | = α (T – P) 
with  0 < α  < 1.  Then  E1 > E2   if and only if  
m1 > ( 1 – α ) / ( 1 + α ) m2 + α / ( 1 + α ) n. 
Example: suppose B1 = 2.5 and B2  =  2.6, and as before P = 1 
and T = 5 so that α = 0.025, and 
m1 > 0.9513 m2 + 0.0244 n. 
Thus, when m2  =  20  and  n =  100 then m1 must be at least  22 
so that the first emperor can triumph above his more efficient 
opponent. 
Q.e.d. 
1.4.3 Collusion detection is an undecidable problem 
The difficulty of detecting collusion practically has been shown in 
previous parts of this chapter. The difficulty of recognizing collusion is 
also supported by the difficulty of solving the problem from a theoretical 
point of view: We show below that the general question of whether two 
strategies of which the source code is known and that do not depend on 
any third party source of randomness are actually colluding or not, is 
undecidable—of course it is even harder when the strategies only are 
known as black boxes, without having access to their source code. 
Simpler arguments than ours would also do but we try in our approach to 
define the formal collusion problem as closely to the practical collusion 
detection problem as possible. 
Remember the definition of the Halting problem: Is there a finite 
deterministic Turing machine H that is able to decide in finitely many 
steps whether an arbitrary finite deterministic Turing machine M 
ultimately will halt or not? It is well known that the Halting problem has 
been shown to be undecidable by Turing. Exact definitions of Turing 
machines and other notions appearing in this section as well as 
references to the original sources can easily be found, e.g., in any 
theoretical computer science reference book such as [Papadimitriou 
1994]. 
Let the Simplified Collusion problem formally be defined as follows: 
Is there a deterministic Turing machine SC that is able to decide in 
finitely many steps whether, given two arbitrary integers i and j, two 
arbitrary finite deterministic Turing machines S1 and S2 will both output 
a sequence of at least length i+j characters (one character per tape 
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position) composed only of the letters `C´ and `D´ on their two separate 
write-once output tapes T1 and T2, such that the j letters starting from 
tape position i+1 will all be `D´s on T1 and all be `C´s on T2?  
This simplistic definition covers many (but surely not all) real 
collusion cases. It also would imply that strategies usually not considered 
colluding consciously like ALLD as T1 and ALLC as T2 would be 
classified as colluding in the Simplified Collusion terminology. 
However, ALLD really could be colluding with a large group of ALLC 
where other more cautious strategies like OTFT would not be able to 
take advantage of ALLC since they never would defect first. Thus, when 
a player or a group of players are able to introduce an ALLD and many 
ALLC into a competition, they could well be part of an intentional 
collusion, and thus the classification in the Simplified Collusion 
terminology would not be completely wrong. Eventually, deciding what 
really is a collusion and what not cannot be solved by formal methods 
alone. Nevertheless, we can at least show the following: 
 
Claim 8.2: The Simplified Collusion problem is undecidable. 
 
Proof: To formally show the undecidability of the Simplified Collusion 
problem, we follow the standard argument by reducing the Halting 
problem to it. Take any finite deterministic one-tape Turing machine M 
for which we want to know whether it halts or not. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the tape of M is infinite in both directions, 
that each combination of the finitely many characters of the alphabet, 
which includes the letters `C´ and `D´, and of the finitely many states of 
M defines exactly one of the finitely many rules of M, and that only the 
special state h stops M.  
To decide whether M halts or not, we construct for each M two new 
Turing machines N1 and N2. N1, in comparison to M, is defined as 
follows: It has an additional initially empty output tape T, an additional 
tape IJ that initially contains the numbers i and j in binary with the 
character `:´ written between the two numbers, an additional state s, and 
a constant number of other states needed to be able to countdown the two 
binary numbers and do the other things described below, and almost the 
same set of rules as M, with only the following changes: each rule of M 
leading to h instead leads to state s, and there is a constant number of 
additional rules that make sure the following: When N1 enters state s, it 
will countdown from i to zero, each time writing one letter `C´ on IJ and 
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then moving one position to the right on IJ, so that at the end a sequence 
of i `C´s is written on IJ. Then it will countdown from j to zero, each 
time writing one letter `D´ on IJ and then moving one position to the 
right on IJ, so that at the end a sequence of i `C´s followed by j `D´s is 
written on IJ. Then it will change to state h and halt. N2 is defined as 
follows: it simply writes i+j letters `C´ to its output tape T. Finally, we 
choose the two numbers i and j, e.g., i = 1 and j = 1. 
It is clear that this construction always leads to a valid instance of the 
Simplified Collusion problem. It is also clear that if and only if M halts, 
then the question posed in the Simplified Collusion problem will have a 
positive answer for the constructed instance of Simplified Collusion 
problem. 
Now, if a finite deterministic Turing machine SC that is able to 
decide the Simplified Collusion problem in finitely many steps would 
exist, then we could also decide the Halting in finitely many steps, as 
follows: We would define a new finite deterministic Turing machine R 
that for any given Turing machine M (properly encoded for R on R´s 
input tape), first constructs (in finitely many steps) an encoding of 
corresponding finite deterministic Turing machines N1 and N2 with i=1 
and j=1 as described above (this surely can be done in finitely many 
steps), then simulates SC applied to this instance of the Simplified 
Collusion problem, thereby deciding in finitely many steps (SC takes 
only finitely many steps, and simulating it on R is also easily feasible in 
finitely man steps) whether it is a yes or a no-instance, and returns this 
answer of SC as the answer of R, which must also be the answer to the 
question of whether M halts or not. So, if the Simple Collusion problem 
is decidable, then the Halting problem must also be decidable. Since we 
know for sure the latter is not true, the former also cannot be true, and 
thus the Simple Collusion problem is undecidable. 
Q.e.d. 
1.5 Conclusion 
We have described our submissions to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
(IPD) competitions of 2004 and 2005, the OmegaTitForTat (OTFT) 
single-player strategy and the CosaNostra group strategy composed of 
one Godfather (CNGF) and several Hitman (CNHM). We also studied 
their performance in the different leagues of the competitions.   
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The observed slight superiority of OTFT in comparison to GRIM 
psychologically is a reassuring result. The charm of OTFT compared to 
GRIM is that OTFT is an intelligent forgiving strategy whereas GRIM, 
as the name implies, is an unforgiving iron-handed pig-head that falls in 
an eternal revenge mode after being deceived a single time.  
We also have established a taxonomy of generalized group strategies 
for IPD competitions. In it, the types of group strategies are classified 
according to their behaviour towards other members of the same group 
and towards strategies outside of their group. We labelled the four 
classes of group strategies studied as democracies during peace (DP), 
democracies at war (DW), empires during peace (EP), and empires at 
war (EW). As we have shown in the previous section, group strategies 
can easily outperform any individual strategy by sheer numerical 
superiority. Group strategies appear at every place in Nature and Human 
Society, and group strategies competing in IPD competitions can serve as 
simplified study objects of the former. It is interesting to note that in the 
analysis in the last section, individual strategies member of a DW group 
fare less well than those of a DP group, and that this relation is reversed 
for empires, EW faring better than EP, not because the emperor itself 
fares better, but because his competitors are more harmed. This is clear 
from the fact that members of DW lose individually more than members 
of DP, whereas emperors at war (EW) fare better than emperors during 
peace (EP), and these better than DW and DP. E.g., emperors at war do 
not have to suffer from their aggressive acts, and actually do better in 
comparison than their opponents by letting the payoff of individuals that 
are not members of their group get lowered by their other, underling 
members, while at the same time retaliation from others does not hit 
them directly (think of real emperors, Mafia bosses, etc).  
But it not even has to be fights for life and death, wars, or outright 
genocide: the same pattern appears in business where larger or more 
advanced companies (in particular their owners) that are more or less 
aggressive can crush competitors or, in extremity, take advantage of 
cheap child-slave labour, thus extremely abusing their own workforce .  
It is also interesting to note that better resources, be it people, money, 
or technology, corresponding to a higher number of individual strategies 
in the group, or better average payoff values against non-group 
strategies, positively influence the overall payoff values of the groups. 
Thus, numerical superiority does not have to mean that the number of 
soldiers is higher, but can also be due to better technology, be it military, 
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commercial, or biological. It is also not surprising that, as described  
point 4.a of Claim 8.1 of Section 1.4.2, individual strategies in 
democracies during peace always “lose” against emperors, the latter 
always being able to get more from his subjects than what he gives in 
return, and certainly more than his unorganized competitors. However, 
given enough superiority, again either in number, money, or technology, 
even democracies at war can win against empires at war (point 4.b of the 
claim in Section 1.4.2), the Second World War for instance having 
several examples of such situations. 
We also showed that group strategies can be subtly camouflaged to 
look like unrelated single-player strategies. These stealth collusion group 
strategies will elude detection with high probability, e.g., by introducing 
a certain amount of noise in the interaction with one’s group members to 
make the collusion less evident. We showed that the differentiation 
between colluding and non-colluding behaviour can be very difficult in 
practice and is generally undecidable from a theoretical point of view.  
In the study of economics, collusion takes place within an industry 
when rival companies cooperate for their mutual benefit. According to 
game theory, the independence of suppliers forces prices to their 
minimum, increasing efficiency and decreasing the price determining 
ability of each individual firm. If one firm decreases its price, other firms 
will follow suit in order to maintain sales, and if one firm increases its 
price, its rivals are unlikely to follow, as their sales would only decrease. 
These rules are used as the basis of kinked-demand theory. If firms 
collude to increase prices as a cooperative, however, loss of sales is 
minimized as consumers lack alternative choices at lower prices. This 
benefits the colluding firms at the cost of efficiency to society 
[Wikipedia: Collusion 2005]. 
There was some discussion whether collusion group strategies were 
actually cheating in the 2004 and 2005 IPD competitions, but since the 
organizers clearly said that cooperating strategies were to be allowed, it 
would have been strange to deny participation to such group strategies. 
What we can say at least is that the detection of StealthCollusion, both in 
future IPD competitions as well as in real life, in practice is very 
difficult. The Mafia, or for that matter, any human organization that is 
not readily recognizable as a group, be it Masonic lodges, secret religious 
groups, or corporate cartels, exist and as such are certainly worth to be 
modelled. Being able to secretly communicate, thereby “colluding” in a 
general sense, is quite common, and in practice forbidding it is nearly 
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infeasible whenever intelligent individuals exchange information 
repeatedly. An exception where a biological occurrence of an IPD 
without information exchange has been reported to take place has been 
described by [Turner and Chao 1999]. They show that certain viruses 
that infect and reproduce in the same host cells seem to be engaged in a 
survival of the fittest-driven prisoner’s dilemma. However, in light of the 
ways different types of bird’s flu viruses infecting the same human cells 
can exchange RNA in order to increase their fitness, it can be argued that 
such emerging colluding group behaviour appears already at this 
relatively low level of life.  
In commerce, collusion is largely illegal due to antitrust law, but 
implicit collusion in the form of price leadership and tacit understandings 
is unavoidable. Several recent examples of explicit collusion in the 
United States include [Wikipedia: Collusion 2005]: 
 
• Price fixing and market division among manufacturers of heavy 
electrical equipment in the 1960s.  
• An attempt by Major League Baseball owners to restrict players' 
salaries in the mid-1980s.  
• Price fixing within food manufacturers providing cafeteria food 
to schools and the military in 1993.  
• Market division and output determination of livestock feed 
additive by companies in the US, Japan and South Korea in 
1996.  
 
There are many ways that implicit collusion tends to develop [Wikipedia: 
Collusion 2005]: 
 
• The practice of stock analyst conference calls and meetings of 
industry almost necessarily cause tremendous amounts of 
strategic and price transparency. This allows each firm to see 
how and why every other firm is pricing their products. Again, 
the line between insider information and just being better 
informed is often very thin.  
• If the practice of the industry causes more complicated pricing, 
which is hard for the consumer to understand (such as risk based 
pricing, hidden taxes and fees in the wireless industry, negotiable 
pricing), this can cause competition based on price to be 
meaningless (because it would be too complicated to explain to 
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the customer in a short ad). This causes industries to have 
essentially the same prices and compete on advertising and 
image, something theoretically as damaging to a consumer as 
normal price fixing. 
 
We predict that all iterated prisoner’s dilemma competitions in the future 
will be dominated by group strategies. Even when in a future IPD 
competition all strategies will be chosen by the same single person who 
consciously tries to avoid that any “group cooperation” happens among 
his strategies, then random and involuntary cooperation that 
mathematically is identical to voluntary cooperation can never be 
excluded. Actually, group cooperation can be self-emerging in a 
population, some strategies involuntarily faring better together and 
possibly against other groups or individuals, however loosely they are 
constituted. We predict that when evolutionary algorithms are used to 
breed new species of IPD strategies, such cooperation will automatically 
emerge at a certain point. 
Cooperation in groups of strategies in IPD competitions mimics 
cooperation of groups in Nature and Human Society—it therefore allows 
modelling another common aspect of cooperative behaviour that so far 
was not explicitly studied in the IPD framework: more or less open 
cooperation of subgroups versus other subgroups or individuals. The 
number of members of the group does not have to correspond to the 
actual number of individuals. Instead, it could also mean the amount of 
money involved, or the technological advantage of one subgroup relative 
to another one. 
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